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Abstract: This paper proposes an algorithm for oblivious transfer using 
elliptic curves. Also, we present its application to chosen one-out-of-two 
oblivious transfer. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
An oblivious transfer scheme is a protocol in which a sender sends a message to a 
receiver with some fixed probability between 0 and 1 without the sender knowing 
whether or not the receiver received the message. The idea was introduced in 1981 by 
Michael Rabin [1], [2]. 
 
Rabin developed a solution to the problem of mutual exchange of secrets between two 
distrustful parties. For example, Alice and Bob have secrets SA and SB, respectively, 
which they wish to exchange (SA may be the password to a file that Bob wants and vice 
versa). The problem is to establish a protocol without a trusted third party and without 
simultaneous exchange of messages. 
 
Rabin exploited the fact that a square transformation , , and 
are primes, results in two or four messages being mapped to a single cipher. Hence, 
using Rabin’s protocol, Alice would convey the factors of  (assuming Alice is using 
a public key encryption method of the form , where is the encryption 
exponent) without knowing for sure whether Bob received the factors or not. In other 
words, Bob may or may not receive the factors, each happening with probability one-
half.  
nmc mod2= qpn ×= p
q
An
A
e nmc mod= e
 
In this paper we introduce an oblivious transfer protocol using elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC), a fast upcoming competitor against RSA. We use exactly the same 
set up as described in [2]. We present an algorithm that achieves oblivious transfer 
between two parties using elliptic curves for encryption of their messages. Section 2 
discuses the basics of elliptic curve cryptography. Section 3 introduces the key 
observation that led to the idea of oblivious transfer and Section 4 presents our 
algorithm together with an illustrative example. Section 5 presents an application of our 
oblivious transfer algorithm to chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. 
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2 Basics of elliptic curves 
 
An elliptic curve used for cryptographic purposes is defined as follows: 
 
baxxy ++= 32          (1) 
 
where and b are integer constants. The set of points is a set of all and 
satisfying (1). 
a ),( baE ),( yx x
y
 
For an elliptic curve over a finite field , we use the cubic equation (1) in which the 
variables and coefficients all take on values in the set of integers from 0 and , for 
some prime
pZ
1−p
p , in which calculations are performed modulo p . Thus, we use  
 
pbaxxpy mod)(mod 32 ++=        (2) 
 
for cryptographic applications over finite fields. This set of points is denoted 
as . The order of a point),( baE p n ),( 11 yxG = on an elliptic curve is defined as the 
smallest positive integer n such that 0=nG . Point G  is called the base point 
in and is picked such that its order is a very large value. ),( baE p n
 
The security of ECC arises from the fact that for kPQ = , where 
and , it is easy to calculate given the values of and , but it is 
relatively very hard to determine given the values of and
),(, baEPQ p∈ pk < Q k P
k Q P .  
 
A standard elliptic curve transfer proceeds as follows: the first task in this system is to 
encode the plain text message to be sent as am x y− point . It is the point that will 
be encrypted as cipher-text and subsequently decrypted. We cannot simply encode the 
message as the or 
mP mP
x y coordinate at a point, because not all such coordinates are 
in . Each user A selects a private key  and generates a public key 
. To encrypt and send a message to B, A chooses a random positive 
integer and produces a cipher-text consisting of the pair of points 
),( baE p An
GnP AA ×= mP
k mC
 
};{ Bmm kPPkGC +=  
 
A has used B’s public key . To decrypt the cipher-text, B multiplies the first point in 
the pair by B’s secret key and subtracts the result from the second point: 
BP
 ( ) ( ) ( ) mBBBBm PkGnGnkPmkGnkPP =−+=−+  
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Note that A has masked the message by adding to it. Nobody but A knows the 
value of , so even though is public, nobody can remove the mask . Reader may 
refer to [3] for further background on elliptic curve cryptography.  
mP BkP
k BP BkP
3 Key Observation 
 
If we look closely at square transformation in [1] and the elliptic curve equation given 
by (2), we can rewrite (2) as  
 
Spy =mod2           (3) 
 
where . It should be clear to the reader that for every 
coordinate there are two possible coordinates. However, unlike in square 
transformation, here neither  nor can be substituted for message, because not all 
values of  and are permissible in ECC.  
pbaxxS mod)( 3 ++=
x y
x y
x y
4 The Proposed Algorithm 
 
Our aim is to allow exchange of secret SA and SB between two parties A and B without 
using a trusted third party and without simultaneous exchange. Here, we do not go into 
the details of signing the messages using ECC and take it for granted that all the 
messages are signed.  
 
Both A and B select a common elliptic curve . This information is public. They 
then decide upon one - coordinate. Let the two points corresponding to this - 
coordinate be  and , whereupon by symmetry 
),( baEq
x x
1P 2P 21 PP −= . The - coordinate is also 
public knowledge. Since, A and B have not decided upon which - coordinate to use, 
we will denote A’s choice of point as  and B’s choice as , such that 
x
y
AP BP
 
1PPA =  or 2PPA =
 
Similarly,  1PPB =  or 2PPB = . 
  
Even though the - coordinate is common, neither party knows what is the final point 
chosen by the other because there are two possible - coordinates to choose from. 
x
y
 
Now, let A choose a secret key , which she wishes to use for encryption of her 
messages, with the aim of obliviously conveying this secret key  to B. Also, we 
assume that a procedure for mapping of  to a point on elliptic curve has been pre-
decided. We call the point on our elliptic curve, corresponding to , as . Thus, if a 
person knows , he can deduce  from it. Similar, arrangement is made on B’s side 
too. 
An
An
An
An AnP
An
P An
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Under the above assumptions, the oblivious transfer of secret key proceeds as follows: 
 
1. A sends to B :   AAPn
  
2. B sends to A :  {  ;  BB Pn ( ) RPnn AAB + ;   } RnB
 
where,  is B’s secret key Bn
 R   is randomly chosen point by B, belonging to the group . ),( baEq
 
3. A does :  [ An ( ) ( )BBAAAB PnnRPnn −+  ]  = Q  
 
4. A sends to B : { ( ) QPnn BBA +  ;  ( ) AnBA PRnn +  } 
 
5. B does :  
a. ( ) ( )AABBBA PnnQPnn −+   = K  
 
b.   =  ( ) KnPRnn BnBA A −+ BZ
 
The sequence of steps presented above achieves our goal of oblivious transfer. The two 
cases that arise in such a transfer are BA PP =  and BA PP ≠ . We discuss these two cases 
below and show how the algorithm given above achieves our goal. 
 
The difference between the two cases arises from step 3. Hence, we analyze them step 3 
onwards. 
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Case I:     BA PP =
 
3. A does :  [ An ( ) ( )BBAAAB PnnRPnn −+  ]  =  RnA
 
4. A send to B : { ( ) RnPnn ABBA +  ; ( ) AnBA PRnn +  } 
 
5. B does : 
a. ( ) ( )AABABBA PnnRnPnn −+  =  RnA
 
b. ( ) ( )RnnPRnn ABnBA A −+   =  AnP
 
 
Case II:     BA PP ≠
 
In this case, we note that . Therefore, the results are as follows: BA PP −=
 
3. A does :  [ An ( ) ( )BBAAAB PnnRPnn −+  ]  = n  [ A ( ) RPnn AAB +×2 ]  
 
4. A send to B : { ( ) ( ) ]2[ RPnnnPnn AABABBA +×+ ;  ( ) AnBA PRnn +  } 
 
5. B does : 
a. ( ) ( ) ( )AABAABABBA PnnRPnnnPnn −+×+ ]2[   =  K  
 
b. ( ) ( )KnPRnn BnBA A −+   ≠   AnP
 
 
Once the receiver knows , he can deduce  from it. Therefore, this point forward 
we refer to  as .  
An
P An
An
P An
 
However, it is to be noted that no matter what calculations are performed by B in step 5, 
he cannot get  if . The problem is equivalent to the discrete log problem in 
case of .  
An BA PP ≠
BA PP ≠
 
Since,  with probability one-half, B receives the secret key  with probability 
one-half. 
BA PP = An
 
Returning to our algorithm, B can verify the value  it has obtained from step 5, 
whether it is  or not, by doing 
BZ
An 1PZB ×  and 2PZ B ×  and checking if one of them is 
equal to  sent to it by A in the first step. AAPn
 
In a similar manner, B transfers its secret key  to A with probability one-half. Once 
this transfer has been achieved we can follow similar step proposed in [2] in order to 
prevent cheating by either of the parties during exchange of information. Here, we 
present these steps, adapting them to suit elliptic curve transfers. We define the state of 
knowledge of the secret keys as follows: 
Bn
 
⎩⎨
⎧
Μ
Μ=
keyretsBknownotdoesAif
keyretsBknowsAif
k A sec',
sec',
  
 
Similarly,  
 
⎩⎨
⎧
Μ
Μ=
keyretsAknownotdoesBif
keyretsAknowsBif
kB sec',
sec',
  
 
where  is a constant and Μ Μ  is the bit wise complement of Μ . 
 
After the transfer of keys according the algorithm presented in this paper and having 
defined the state of knowledge of keys as above, 
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A sends to B:  AA Sk ⊕
 
B sends to A:  BB Sk ⊕
 
Note that the above two steps do not provide either party any information about other’s 
secret. Now, A may transfer its secret to B using an elliptic curve cryptographic 
transfer. However, A will encode the secret using its own secret key and not the public 
key of the other party, as is usually done in a standard elliptic curve transfers; G is the 
base point with large order. 
 
A sends to B      :  GnS AA +  
 
B does (assuming he knows  ) :  An GnGnS AAA −+  =  AS
 
B transfers its secret to A in the next step in a similar manner. However, suppose, at the 
last step B were to cheat and not pass on his secret  to A, then the fact that B has 
cheated A implies that B has , i.e. 
BS
An BB Sk ⊕  = BS⊕Μ . 
  
Thus, A can do  and thus obtain . The probability, when the 
protocol is completed, that neither one knows other’s secret is one-quarter. 
BB SS =Μ⊕⊕Μ BS
 
Example: Let A and B choose an elliptic curve . The equation corresponding 
to this curve is . Now, both parties decide upon a 
common - coordinate, say 7. The two points corresponding to this - coordinate are 
and . From properties of elliptic curve, we have .   
)21,9(23E
23mod)219(23mod 32 ++= xxy
x x
)6,7(1 =P )17,7(2 =P 21 PP −=
 
Let A choose a secret number 5=An . We do not explore the details of its mapping of 
to the elliptic curve and just refer to it as . In turn, let B chooses a secret number 
 and a random point . Now we execute our algorithm by considering the 
two cases separately: 
An AnP
3=Bn )1,2(=R
  
Case1:  and  )6,7(=AP )6,7(=BP
 
1. A sends to B: )18,11()6,7(5 ==AAPn . 
 
2. B sends to A:   
})19,14();5,11();10,1({
})1,2(3);1,2()18,11(3);6,7(3{};)(;{
=
+=+ RnRPnnPn BAABBB  
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3. A does:  
  
)17,7(])1,2([5
])9,13()5,11([5
])10,1(5)5,11([5
])()([
==
−=
−=
=−+ QPnnRPnnn BBAAABA
 
4. A sends to B: 
})13,1(;)9,15({
})19,14(5;)17,7()9,13({})(;)({
A
AA
n
nnBABBA
P
PPRnnQPnn
+=
++=++
 
 
5. B does: 
a) KPnnQPnn AABBBA =−+ )()(  
      )18,11(3)9,15( −=  
      )9,13()9,15( −=  
      )17,7(=  
 
b) )17,7(3)13,1()()( −+=−+
AA nBnBA
PKnPRnn  
  )13,1()13,1( −+=
An
P  
  
An
P=  
 
Case 2:  and  )6,7(=AP )17,7(=BP
 
1. A sends to B: )18,11()6,7(5 ==AAPn . 
 
2. B sends to A:   
})19,14();5,11();13,1({
})1,2(3);1,2()18,11(3);17,7(3{};)(;{
=
+=+ RnRPnnPn BAABBB  
3. A does:  
  
)7,9(])11,3([5
])14,13()5,11([5
])13,1(5)5,11([5
])()([
==
−=
−=
=−+ QPnnRPnnn BBAAABA
 
4. A sends to B: 
})13,1(;)2,17({
})19,14(5;)7,9()14,13({})(;)({
A
AA
n
nnBABBA
P
PPRnnQPnn
+=
++=++
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5. B does: 
a) KPnnQPnn AABBBA =−+ )()(  
)18,11(3)2,17( −=  
      )9,13()2,17( −=  
      )22,2(=  
 
 
 
b) )22,2(3)13,1()()( −+=−+
AA nBnBA
PKnPRnn  
  )4,14()13,1( −+=
An
P  
  
An
P≠  
 
The above example makes the working of our algorithm clear. 
 
5 Chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer 
 
The chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, - OT for short, is an important 
application of the basic oblivious transfer protocol. In this transfer, the sender sends two 
secrets  and and the receiver’s input is choice bit c ; the latter then learns but 
gets no information about other secret . 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
1
2
0s 1s cs
cs −1
 
This transfer has been implemented using exponentiations. Here we show that the one-
out-of-two oblivious transfer can be implemented using the algorithm we presented. 
 
We assume that both parties are willing to take part in the protocol honestly, i.e. A is 
willing to disclose one out of two secrets that it has to B, but B does not want A to 
know which one secret it wants to know. Also, B should learn only the one secret it 
wants to know and nothing about the other. 
 
A is said to have two secrets  and . A, associates two different secret keys with each 
of them. These secret keys will be used to encrypt  and  when transferring them to 
B. B must be able to retrieve only one of these two secrets and A should not come to 
know, what B has extracted. 
0s 1s
0s 1s
 
Let A associate keys with and with  for encryption. Now, B’s task is to 
retrieve one of these two keys, i.e. retrieve  if it wants to know and retrieve  if 
it wants to know , in such a manner that A should not come to know which key B 
retrieved and B should not gain any information about the other key associated with the 
other secret. 
0An 0s 1An 1s
0An 0s 1An
1s
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Recall, from the previous section that every - coordinate yields two points  and  
such that . A declares that it is associating secret with point  and secret 
with point . The transfer of secret then proceeds as follows: 
x 1P 2P
21 PP −= 0s 1P
1s 2P
 
1. A sends to B : {   ;    } 10 PnA 21PnA
 
2. B sends to A : {  ;   BB Pn ( ) RPnn AB +10  ;   ( ) RPnn AB +21  ;    } RnB
 
3. A does :  
0An [ ( ) ( )BBAAB PnnRPnn 010 −+  ] =  ;    1H
 
1An  [ ( ) ( )BBAAB PnnRPnn 121 −+  ] = . 2H
 
4. A sends to B :  
{  ; ( ) 10 HPnn BBA + ( ) 00 AnBA PRnn +  ;      ( ) 21 HPnn BBA +  ;  } ( ) 11 AnBA PRnn +
 
Note:  and  is the mapping of secret keys  and  to points on the elliptic 
curve. 
0An
P
1An
P 0An 1An
 
B must have chosen   in the second step such that BP 1PPB =  if B wants secret and 
 if B wants secret . Therefore after step 4, B picks up only one of the two pairs 
of points sent to it by A which will yield it the secret key it wants.  
0s
2PPB = 1s
 
For example, if B has chosen 1PPB =   then the first pair of points in step 4, i.e.               
{  ;  }, will yield  in the following manner : ( ) 10 HPnn BBA + ( ) 00 AnBA PRnn + 0An
 
5. B does : 
a) ( ) ( ) RnHPnnHPnn AABBBA 011010 ==−+   
b) ( ) ( )RnnPRnn ABnBA A 00 0 ++  =  . 0AnP
 
From , B can easily calculate .   The second pair of points will not yield any key. 
Thus, B can get only one of the two secret keys and A remains oblivious to the fact that 
which of the two keys did B retrieve.  
0An
P 0An
 
Now, A may send both the secrets to B in the following manner: 
 
A sends to B:  { ; GnPs A00 + GnPs A11 +  }, where  is the mapping of secret  to 
the elliptic curve. 
0Ps 0s
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B will be able to retrieve only in our example because it has only  and hence 
obtain . It will not be able to get any information from the second half of the message 
about secret . A does not know which of the two secrets did B obtain. We have 
achieved our goal of chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfers. 
0Ps 0An
0s
1s
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have introduced the idea of oblivious transfer to elliptic curves and 
presented an algorithm for its implementation. Also, we have shown how it can be 
applied to the traditional problem of - OT.  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
1
2
The algorithm presented here may be expressed in different variants. The key 
contribution is the introduction of oblivious transfer to ECC. The one-out-of-two 
oblivious transfer may be further modified in order to obtain 1-out-of-n oblivious 
transfer.  
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